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The Transformation of Thailand from an 
Agrarian into an Industrial Society 
 
Luuk Knippenberg1 
 
Abstract 
 
The topic of this article is the transformation of 
Thailand from an agrarian into an industrial society. 
This kind of transformation – or development - is far 
more difficult to realise than is generally assumed, and 
for quite other reasons than often thought.  
The main theory – based on ideas of the British 
anthropologist Ernest Gellner – is that there is a 
fundamental gap, in the political, social, economic, 
cognitive and cultural sphere, between agrarian and 
industrial societies. There is no continuity, let alone 
some kind of necessary historical development 
culminating in industrial society. Agrarian society can 
exist forever and has no internal drive to change into 
another kind of society. In fact, everything in it militates 
against the sheer possibility of a fundamental change. 
Therefore, it is more likely that the transformation of an 
agrarian society into an industrial one – or in other 
words the process of ‘development’- will fail, than that 
it will succeed.  
The transformation of Thailand is a good case to apply 
and test this theory… 
 
Introduction 
This article is a summary of my recent dissertation – 
written in Dutch - on the transformation of Thailand 
from an agrarian into an industrial2 society (Knippen-
berg, 2003).  
                                                     
1 University of Nijmegen (Nimèque), The Netherlands, 
l.knippenberg@maw.kun.nl  
2 Agrarian societies are societies which produce food, store 
it, and acquire other forms of storable wealth. The 
emergence of agrarian societies is based on one discovery, 
namely, the possibility of food production. Innovation does 
The thesis raised and defended in that dissertation is 
that becoming an industrial country -  a  developed 
country – is a far more difficult task than is generally 
assumed, and for quite other reasons than often 
thought. In fact, if one looks more closely at the 
characteristics of a successfully industrial country and 
compares these with the characteristics of an agrarian 
society, it is more likely that this kind of transformation 
will fail, than succeed. 
This finding – which is easy sustainable, for instance, 
from an array of statistics over the last decades by the 
World Bank, the IMF or the OECD  – inspired me to 
look for a country which had successfully witnessed 
such a transformation. The choice fell on Thailand. 
The transformation of that country has a long history, 
more than 150 years, and followed a capricious path. 
About one hundred years ago, Thailand was seen as 
‘a nearly modern society’. About fifty years ago, it was 
seen as a retarded or underdeveloped agrarian society 
and, about ten years ago, the country was seen as ‘a 
good example of successful industrialisation’, as a new 
member of the ‘Club of Newly Industrialising 
Countries’.  
The aim of the dissertation therefore was to describe 
and analyse the long-term transformation of Thailand. 
The time span covered is roughly the period from 1850 
to 1985, although it was necessary to start somewhat 
earlier in order to explain later developments.  
 
                                                                        
occur, but not as part of some constant, cumulative and 
exponential process (Gellner, 1988, p. 16-17).  
An industrial society is a society in which the production of 
food becomes a minority occupation, and where production 
is generally based on a powerful and, above all, 
continuously growing technology. (Gellner, 1988, p. 17). 
The concepts modernisation and industrialisation are often 
used interchangeably, or the former is treated as one 
aspect of the latter. (Wrightley, 1987, p. 48.). Following 
Wrightley, I want to consider modernisation as a necessary 
prerequisite of industrialisation, but not a sufficient one. The 
two main characteristics of modernisation, as a prerequisite 
of industrialisation, are instrumental rationality and 
calculated self-interest. 
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I. Theory 
As a point of departure for my investigation I have 
used a theory developed by Gellner (1988) about this 
transformation process. Gellner’s starting point is that 
there is a fundamental gap, in the political, social, 
cognitive and cultural sphere, between agrarian and 
industrial societies. In his view, there is no continuity, 
let alone some kind of a necessary historical 
development culminating in industrial society. The 
agrarian society is not a pre-phase of industrial 
society. It is a society which can exist for ever and 
which has no internal drive to change into another kind 
of society. In fact, everything in an agrarian society 
militates against the sheer possibility of a fundamental 
change. 
Industrialisation leads not only to a complete 
transformation of the society, but it also offers 
countries which have gone through this process 
unmistakable economic, military and political 
advantages over countries in which this process has 
not occurred. This was already visible immediately 
after the Industrial Revolution had taken place in Great 
Britain. 
Industrialisation is not an automatically emerging and 
developing process. Whether or not, how and in which 
context and constellation, industrialisation and, 
certainly, successful economic development takes 
place is thus, according to Gellner, strongly historically 
and locally conditioned. 
The developing countries, labelled by Gellner as 
transitional states, consequently find themselves in a 
particularly tricky situation. On the one hand, 
industrialisation is the imperative imposed on all 
modern governments, while on the other hand, it 
fundamentally demolishes the old social formations in 
the developing countries. This forces these societies to 
create a totally new social order, precisely at a time 
where it is becoming clear for the first time in history 
that social creation is impossible. These countries 
therefore face an impossible task. Industrialisation, 
and certainly successful industrialisation, is therefore 
the exception, rather than the rule. 
The strength of Gellner’s theory is not only that Gellner 
begins his analysis where others end, but also that he 
explicitly describes the political, social, economic, 
cognitive and cultural transformations through which 
agrarian societies have to pass in order to change into 
industrial societies. These are historically traceable 
and verifiable transformations. 
 
Agrarian society 
According to Gellner, there is no place in an agrarian 
society for purely rational economic behaviour, aimed 
only at maximising profit. Such behaviour would deny 
in a disastrous manner all other mutual considerations 
and relations which also form part of every agreement. 
Agrarian societies are characterised by scarcity. There 
is only a relatively small, storable and easy appropri-
able surplus. The relatively small surplus can only 
support a small non-productive group. The majority of 
the population lives a life of submission, totally 
dedicated to production. A threefold division into 
producers, soldiers and clerks is characteristic of most 
agrarian societies.  
The dependence on a relatively small surplus makes 
conflicts about the division of that surplus endemic. 
And these conflicts have an inbuilt tendency to 
escalate. As a result, these societies are characterised 
both by an inbuilt tendency to instability and a need for 
political and ideological stability. They are marked not 
by change but by exactly the opposite. The outcome of 
this paradox is that most agrarian societies are 
dominated by a small group or upper stratum, which 
tries to completely monopolise power and lives by 
creaming off the surplus. But this group is continuously 
threatened by internal fragmentation, because it has 
only limited means to organise its power effectively. 
The paradoxical situation that stability is an absolute 
necessity, but is at the same time very labile and 
continuously undermined by centrifugal forces, makes 
the role of legitimacy3 as the cement of society very 
large and, with it, also the role of those who claim 
legitimacy. And it leads to a legitimacy which not only 
                                                     
 3 Acknowledgement of power based on preferably written 
rules.  
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stresses stability and status quo, but even sanctifies 
them: in a world in which conflicts are immanent and 
endemic, the norms and values to check them have to 
be stable and transcendent. 
In such a world, the stimuli for economic accumulation 
are very scanty. Not only because the power holders 
are inclined to appropriate all the surplus and leave the 
producers only just enough to keep on functioning, but 
also because, in a society where political power 
dominates production, producers and traders are 
inclined to convert their resources as quickly as 
possible into political power. The producers and 
traders are forced to spend their gains as quickly as 
possible. And the only 'productive' ways to do this, are 
'buying themselves into' the ruling circles or converting 
their wealth into religious goods, in order to gain the 
support of those who claim legitimacy.  
In these circumstances, the clerical-military elite 
always benefits, in one way or another. It does not 
matter whether or not new members enter or old 
members disappear, nor does it even matter whether 
the whole composition of the elite changes periodi-
cally. The whole political and ideological organisation 
of an agrarian society blocks the use of the surplus for 
the enlargement of production. Everything in an 
agrarian society blocks the pursuit of economic 
growth. 
 
Industrial society 
An industrial society, on the contrary, is totally based 
and directed at continuous economic and cognitive 
growth. 
In an agrarian society, a productive strategy, 
dominated by a purely economic principle, is an 
impossibility and even an absurdity, except for some 
politically and morally stigmatised and isolated, and 
consequently easily manipulated and therefore useful 
groups, who have no other opportunities. Economic 
motives are indissolubly bound up with and subjected 
to other considerations. 
In an industrial society, the maximisation of economic 
profit is the overruling principle. And that principle can 
be pursued without being restrained by other 
considerations. Characteristic of an industrial society is 
the dominance of instrumental economic rationality 
(the pursuit of one or more separable goals). An 
instrumental rational economic mentality requires an 
instrumentally rational attitude towards nature. The two 
go together and reinforce each other. The maximisa-
tion of economic surplus requires the presence of a big 
and growing surplus, in other words, a total and 
endless expansion of the market, to the extent that 
whole societies and even the international social 
system are dominated by it, requiring a continuous 
cognitive and technological expansion. Such a 
cognitive expansion not only requires a vision that 
nature can be understood and manipulated, but also a 
society in which the old political and ideological forces 
do not block such a cognitive expansion. In other 
words, it requires the old ideological and political 
powers who formed the cement of the agrarian society 
and are opposed to change out of self-interest or 
conviction to lose their preponderance. 
The industrial world is characterised by a total – and 
not a gradually - different division of labour. In the 
agrarian world, the essential division was that between 
specialists in power, specialists in ideology and 
producers. By contrast, in the industrial world, such 
divisions are denied or concealed. There is no 
formalised division between the rulers and the ruled. 
Those who rule the state have to claim to be 
representatives of the people, in one way or another. 
They have to do that, because they can derive their 
mandate to rule from nothing else. The difference 
between them and the population is gradual and not 
fundamental. An industrial society is democratic in the 
sense that the notion of a separate political-military 
class is considered to be improper. Producers are no 
longer politically castrated. The binding element in an 
industrial society is culture4. This culture has to allow 
                                                     
     4 Cultures can loosely be defined as systems of 
concepts or ideas which guide thought and conduct. 
Cultures are socially transmitted. A culture is a distinct way 
of doing things which characterises a given community and 
which is not dictated by the genetic make-up of its 
members (Gellner, 1988, p. 14). 
Asia in Extenso, Juin 2003  
publication de recherche en ligne / an on line research publication 
www.iae.univ-poitiers.fr 
 
 
 
 
 4
everyone to communicate with everyone else. And this 
requires cultural homogeneity. There is no room for 
fundamental cultural heterogeneity and layering, which 
are so typical and useful in an agrarian society. 
Cultural homogeneity needs a culture which can be 
universalised, standardised and homogenised. The 
cultures most suited for this purpose are the so-called 
‘high cultures’, cultures based on centralised, literate 
religions. Cultural homogeneity also requires the 
presence of a universal, homogenous education 
system, based on writing, which obligatory for all the 
members of the society. This culture has to be 
protected and the transfer of this culture has to be 
effected by a centre devoted to this culture. 
As a consequence, the presence of a state in an 
industrial society is more than just a condition, it is a 
necessary condition. This state usually has the form of 
a nation state. A nation is a group of people who claim 
to share the same identity (culture) and who live within 
or strive at a political entity which contains all - and 
only those - who share the same identity. Culture is the 
only, 'natural' condition for political legitimacy. Fusion 
of will, culture and politics is the norm.  
Gellner points out that the confrontation of agrarian 
societies with industrial ones has great consequences 
for the first category. But Gellner also points to a 
complication: everything in an agrarian society blocks 
the emergence of actors and rules which contribute 
positively to transformation into an industrial society. It 
is precisely in the difference between the political, 
economic, social and ideological conditions of an 
agrarian and an industrial society that the core has to 
be sought of an explanation of why some countries 
realise successful economic development and others 
do not. 
 
Transformation: opportunities and bottlenecks 
According to Gellner, successful transformation 
requires the appropriation of surplus to be subordi-
nated to the enlargement of that surplus, politics to be 
subordinated to economics, and political legitimacy to 
become not only secular, but even to be based on a 
concept such as sovereignty of the people. This 
reversal requires a strategy which is in blatant 
contradiction to the strategy needed in an agrarian 
society. And this reversal leads to a strengthening of 
precisely those actors who have a subordinated 
position in an agrarian society: the producers and 
traders, since the latter have the benefit of already 
possessing a productive strategy, dominated by a 
purely economic principle, especially those actors who 
previously had no other means to survive, because 
they were politically and otherwise excluded and 
stigmatised. 
But the industrial world not only offers unprecedented 
possibilities for economic growth, but also unprece-
dented possibilities for the employment of effective 
political power and control. As a consequence, actors 
who are dominant in an agrarian society are inclined to 
develop strategies aimed at taking over the useful 
elements, but forestalling fundamental changes. And 
that is what happens in many developing countries. 
Such a strategy is devastating for a real process of 
industrialisation and modernisation. 
However, at the same time, the position of these 
dominant actors is undermined, above all, by the fact 
that they are confronted with an insurmountable 
problem of legitimacy. They stand with one leg in the 
'old' world and with the other in the 'new'. This deprives 
them of the possibility of changing their power into 
authority. Its is no longer possible to refer in a credible 
way to the old 'sacral' legitimacy, while what they strive 
at and do is also irreconcilable - at least in the long 
term - with what is considered to be legitimate in the 
modern world: the claim to further the prosperity and 
wellbeing of the people, the nation or the country. 
Continuous economic growth is possible only if the 
pursuit of economic growth for its own sake has 
become the basic principle of a society, at which all 
political acts and strategies of the dominant groups are 
primarily aimed. If there is to be successful industriali-
sation, then, as Barrington Moore has accurately 
expressed it: 'The commercial and industrial leaders 
must be on their way to become the dominant element 
in society' (Barrington Moore, 1974, p. 424).   
It is clearly a road with many traps. If this modernisa-
tion process has not been halted at an early stage, 
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there usually emerge coalitions between influential 
politically dominant groups and/or  persons and 
important commercial groups and/or persons, if and 
when traders and industrialists have gained a certain 
amount of power. This is a decisive phase. When the 
emerging industrialists and traders are too weak and 
too dependent to obtain real decisive political power 
and, instead, throw themselves politically into the arms 
of dominant political groups or the bureaucracy, it is 
likely that the process of industrialisation will be 
hampered or smothered.  
In order to achieve successful and lasting industrialisa-
tion, certain conditions have to be met: 
• rationalisation of the political order. A strong 
central state has to be established, with a strictly 
defined territory, a uniform administrative system and 
a sufficiently strong army and police force. A 
characteristic trait of most agrarian states is the lack 
of a central authority which can really enforce its 
power in the whole of the nominally subjected 
territory: the real power of central ruler, bureaucracy 
and army are limited, power has to be based on 
personal bonds; 
• the creation of new bonds of loyalty, which involve 
the whole population: loyalty in the first place with an 
abstraction, the state, not with a person. Gellner calls 
this the creation of cultural homogeneity. According 
to him, this cultural homogeneity is essential: 
societies which do not succeed in creating the 
necessary cultural homogeneity will fall apart and 
form new societies and countries in which this 
cultural homogeneity can be created or appears to be 
creatable5.  
• the leadership has to be able to resist pressures 
and opposition from the top, from groups within the 
elite and the bureaucracy, by paralysing or co-opting 
these groups. And it has to be able to resist pressure 
from below. The government has to be autonomous 
to a great degree.  
                                                     
     5 This cultural homogeneity cannot be created out of 
nothing, it has to be built on real or presumed historical 
fundaments, which are, however, totally changed in the 
course of this process. 
 
The key problem of each transitional society lies in the 
fact that the social structure has to be fundamentally 
changed, without it being clear how this is to be done. 
And the key problem of each government is that it can 
perhaps control the counter-forces from above and 
below but, at the same time, is strongly inclined to 
preserve the old social structures, because its power is 
built on them. 
 
II. The transformation of Thailand: applica-
tion and main conclusions 
 
Application 
 
Help theories and indicators 
 
Help theories 
In order to apply this theory to Thailand some 
theoretical and methodical additions had to be made. It 
would be going too far to elaborate too much on them 
in this summary. Suffice it to say that the theory of 
Gellner had to be both expanded and restricted.  
It was expanded by adding the structuration theory of 
Giddens (1984). This was done in order to obtain a 
greater grip on such notions as actor and structure, 
power and authority, and the interrelation between 
rules and resources (material and immaterial).  
It was restricted - more fine tuned to the concrete 
historical context of Thailand – by using so-called help 
theories to describe and analyse specific historical 
periods and conditions.  
For the examination of the period before 1855, the 
period when Thailand could be considered to be an 
agrarian society, Tambiah’s model of the Galactic state 
(1973) was used. This model seemed to be a good 
tool for looking at the specific (agrarian) conditions of 
Thailand, as opposed, for instance, to the conditions of 
a medieval European agrarian society. 
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In order to study the role of external factors and actors 
up to the 1930s, a theory developed by Paauw and Fei 
(1973) was used. They developed a theory to explain 
the depth and magnitude of the influence of the 
colonial economy up to World War II in Southeast 
Asia, including Thailand, although that country was 
formally never colonised.  
In order to describe and analyse the role of external 
factors and actors between the 1930s and 1985, 
several theories were used. These theories go into the 
causes of the internationalisation of commerce, 
industry and finance in the 20th century. The theories 
or models used were developed by Vernon (1966, 
1971), Dunning (1988, 1992), Strange (1988) and 
Schwartz (1994).  
To examine the internal political transformation in 
Thailand between the 1930s and 1985, some theories 
specific to Thailand were used: those of Skinner (1958, 
1959), Riggs (1966), and Jacobs (1971). Skinner 
analysed the political and economic role of the ethnic 
Chinese in Thailand, from the 19th century onward. 
Riggs developed a theory to explain why the 
transformation of Thailand appeared blocked in the 
1950s. Jacobs offered extra elements to support the 
theory of Riggs, by going more deeply into the 
patrimonial and personal character of social and 
political relations in Thailand. 
To study the economic transformation of Thailand 
between the 1930s and 1985 the Evans’ theory (1995) 
about embedded autonomy was used. It explains the 
different possibilities, boundaries and consequences of 
state intervention in the economy. 
 
Indicators  
On the basis of the meta-theory of Giddens, the overall 
substantial theory of Gellner and the different help 
theories, a list of indicators was developed to measure 
whether Thailand was once an agrarian society, 
whether and how it changed – under what conditions 
and in which direction, what were the push and pull 
factors – and whether, and if so, when and to what 
extent, Thailand has become an industrial country. I 
developed both a main, all-encompassing list and a 
more specific list derived from it and specified for each 
chapter. In the conclusion at the end of each chapter, I 
checked whether the main finding did or did not 
correspond with the indicators and what were the 
implications of the outcome discussed. At the end of 
the study, the same approach was adopted for the 
main indicators. 
 
Method 
The research method used was a historical one. The 
sources used were written sources of all kinds, 
although almost none in Thai, interviews with all 
kinds of people in Thailand, from advisers of the 
prime minister to bankers, businessmen, the military, 
politicians, academics, journalist, members of NGO’s, 
activists, company employees, construction workers, 
farmers and slum-dwellers, sometimes with the help 
of a translator. However, the interviews as such are 
not mentioned as sources; they were used as a 
check on the written information.  
The method used to describe and analyse the 
material, to connect theory, indicators and the 
concrete context in Thailand, over time, was that of 
narration. As a large part of the introduction was 
dedicated to explaining in depth why this method is 
the best one to use, this means that any effort to do 
this in a few sentences is bound to fail. However, I 
shall try to do so.  
Every social scientific method which tries to combine 
a description and analysis of a long term macro-
process and theoretical notions is confronted with the 
paradox that putting the accent on theoretical 
relevancy and methodological accuracy will lead to 
less relevance and accuracy as far as the concrete 
context is concerned, and vice versa. It is not 
possible totally to overcome this problem, other than 
by avoiding the study of long-term processes 
altogether - and not even then. However, if we do not 
study long-term macro- processes, this does not 
mean that they do not occur. In fact, using narration 
seems the best - if not the only - way to describe and 
analyse long-term processes in time and space.  
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This is also true because language, which is still the 
main research instrument in the social sciences, is 
always polyvalent. It is impossible to strictly define 
any concept without reference to a concrete context 
outside language. Narration is the only method which 
combines theory and a concrete context without 
disturbing the broader contextual framework, 
neglecting the role of the unique events and 
coincidence, or blasting the theory itself. Story-telling 
is the best way to transmit who we are, what we are 
striving at and what we do. 
 
Main conclusions 
The first question to answer was whether the Thai 
society around 1850 was an agrarian society 
conform, and, if so, what the main characteristics of 
this society were. 
The main conclusion was that Thai society could 
indeed be considered to be an agrarian society, 
although a very sophisticated one, with some unique 
characteristics. The most important of these features 
was the existence of very complex and adaptive 
bureaucratic system, based on both personal bonds 
and sacral authority with, at its apex, a king attributed 
with absolute authority. It was clearly a system suited 
to cope with changes, including disturbing external 
influences.  
Another important conclusion was that, at the time, 
Thai society was not going through a fundamental 
transformation in the direction of an industrial society, 
in the sense meant by Gellner. However, this does 
not mean the society did not experience other 
fundamental changes, including economic ones. 
 
The next issue to examine was the role of external 
influences working upon Thai society, from around 
1830 up to the 1930s, with the emphasis on the role 
of the ‘new style’ European colonialism. 
The main conclusion was that Thai society was well 
equipped to cope with Europe’s aggressive ‘new 
style’ colonialism of the 19th century, and had the luck 
to first be confronted by the British, who were mainly 
looking for trading opportunities – this in contrast to 
the French, who were looking for territory. 
The Thai elite proved to be very adaptive, partly 
because they already had a long experience with 
outside traders, partly because they had seen what 
had happened with the Burmese when they tried to 
resist the new awful force of European – British - 
colonialism, and partly because the conditions 
stipulated by the British did not seem too bad to 
comply with, at least for the leading figures high up in 
the hierarchy.  
The Thai government quickly signed a series of 
treaties, first with the British and later with the main 
other western countries. In exchange for granting a 
lot of rights to foreign entrepreneurs, and bankers – 
who became virtual immune for Thai regulations and 
laws - and opening up its market to western products, 
Thailand kept its political independence – and even 
got some protection of the British against French 
advances, at the end of the 19th century.  
Even so, the new conditions triggered a process of 
transformation that, in the end, gave birth to a new 
kind of economic rationality and organisation, and 
undermined the possibility of the Thai government 
effectively controlling a large part of its economy. 
However, this transformation did not go so far as to 
change Thai society from an agrarian into an 
industrial one. In fact, Thailand became more or less 
a semi-colony in the economic sense, although it 
remained politically independent.  
 
From an internal perspective the period between the 
1850s and 1930s was one of drastic political 
changes. Legitimacy gradually shifted from an 
absolute sacral one, via a more patriarchal sacral 
one, towards a worldly, but absolute, one. But, in first 
decades of the 20th century, the foundation of this 
absolute, but ‘enlightened’, legitimacy also slowly 
decayed. In 1932, it was ended by peaceful 
revolution, which led to the drafting of a constitution, 
in which legitimacy was based on the concept of the 
sovereignty of the people, but the monarchy was not 
abolished.  
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As far as the political power was concerned, the 
changes perhaps were even more drastic. The whole 
political power structure was thoroughly modified. 
The best word to describe the nature of these 
changes is rationalisation, in the Weberian sense. 
Even more remarkable than the extent of the 
changes, was the fact that they could be carried out 
so quickly, smoothly and peacefully.  
This was possible because some the main character-
istics needed for this transformation already were – 
paradoxically enough - present in Thai society. This 
conclusion fits in with the theory of Gellner, who 
states that successful transformation, in fact, requires 
agrarian societies already to have the capacity to 
change. Thailand, for instance, already had a central 
government and state apparatus, complete with a 
bureaucracy and military, although differently 
oriented, organised, staffed and paid. The Thai 
government also had much experience with profound 
reorganisations of the bureaucracy - and the cultural 
and sacral legitimacy and even duty to do this. This is 
perhaps the central point, and as such the main 
reason why Thailand succeeded as one of the few 
countries in the region, in transforming away from an 
agrarian society, without becoming a colony, 
disintegrating or imploding. 
 
However, even in the 1930s, the main conditions for 
a real transformation were lacking. The social order 
was still an agrarian one, with a threefold distinction 
in a small upper layer of bureaucrats and military 
men, a small and dependent layer of businessmen – 
socially excluded from the society as a whole – and a 
large group of producers, mostly farmers, with, at 
best, local loyalties and no political power. In the 
physical sense, Thailand was put on the map, but the 
making of the Thai –nation state still had to be 
undertaken.  
But, just as important was the fact that the actors 
who had taken over political power in the 1930s 
onward lacked indisputable legitimacy. The concepts 
of sovereignty of the people and constitution were 
new, western ‘imports’. In fact, the whole revolution 
of the 1930s was the work of a few hundred men, 
partly educated in Europe, and only some of them 
joined the revolution because of a deep understand-
ing of, and longing for, what those concepts 
expressed. 
It would also be going too far to state that the striving 
for economic maximisation or even economic 
development – on behalf of the people – had been 
the main political motive up to the 1930s. On the 
contrary, political rationales almost permanently had 
the upper hand over economic ones and economic 
resources were constantly used for political and even 
factional purposes. 
But, at the same time, Thai society underwent – 
slowly but constantly - huge changes in depth. The 
importance of purely economic motives and actors 
became increasingly visible and more difficult to 
deny. At the same time, the social stratification 
became more multifaceted and fluid.  
 
The period after 1930 was internationally very 
dynamic, both politically and economically, even if 
viewed from a strictly Thailand-oriented perspective. 
To mention some ‘events’: the Great Depression, 
Second World War, decolonisation, Cold War, 
Vietnam war, oil crises, revival of the world market 
and internationalisation of production and finance. It 
is hardly an overstatement to say that the world as a 
whole went through a whole chain of far-reaching 
political and economic metamorphoses. They did not 
leave Thailand unaffected, to say the least.  
With respect to Thailand the main conclusion is that it 
survived all these ‘shock-events’ remarkably well, 
better than most non-western countries and ex-
colonies. The explanation for this has  – in the end - 
to be sought in two circumstances. The fact that 
Thailand has never been a colony – because of 
already mentioned circumstances -  and the fact that 
the Thai government, in order to avoid being 
colonised, had followed a very prudent macro-
economic financial or, better, monetary  – policy 
since the 1850s.  
The depression of the 1930s did hit Thailand hard, 
but it did not wholly destroy the economy, because of 
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a prudent economic policy of not spending what you 
do not have, a policy which in the beginning was 
forced upon the Thai by the British, but later on had 
become the main Thai bureaucratic reflex to avoid 
foreign debts, which all to easily resulted in a alibi for 
foreign intervention and colonisation. 
The Japanese did not crush Thailand in World War II, 
because it had its own, non-European, government 
which could negotiate and decide, and did so 
brilliantly. The same was true at the end of the war, 
when the Thai government negotiated its way out of 
its previous collaboration with the Japanese, by 
talking mostly to the new world power in force, the 
Americans. An extra advantage of this new coalition 
with the Americans was that these were – at the time 
– strongly anti-colonial: they supported, even 
required - world-wide de-colonisation. In Thailand de-
colonisation meant mainly that the European 
entrepreneurs and bankers were blocked from 
coming back after the war and were replaced by local 
ones – although these were ethnic Chinese in origin.  
For Thailand the Cold War meant siding with the 
Americans, although that war threatened to become 
too hot for Thailand to handle with the outbreak of the 
Vietnam War. The Americans pulled the Thai through 
the dangerous sixties and early seventies by giving a 
lot of help, from military through financial and 
economic to educational. When they left the region in 
the mid-1970s, frustrated and defeated, they left 
Thailand behind as the one domino  that did not fell, 
although there were Communists everywhere, 
including inside Thailand. 
The seventies also in Thailand ended as a period of 
economic crisis, because of the oil crises. But, after a 
period of economic adventurism -such as closing 
itself partly off for the world market, large scale 
lending abroad and investing this money in huge and 
in the economic sense risky or even unproductive 
industrial projects -the old prudent way of doing 
things regained favour: do not buy too much with 
borrowed money and do not turn your back on the 
world market.  
In the 1980s when large parts of the ‘old’ industrial-
ised world struggled to avoid economic recession, an 
old ‘ally‘ came to the rescue of Thailand: the 
Japanese. The Japanese economy had become so 
competitive that the value of Japanese currency rose 
constantly compared to the American and Europese 
currencies. In order to stay competitive the Japanese 
industry had to internationalise.  Thailand became 
their favourite regional production and export 
platform, because of its political and economic 
stability, and for the Japanese recognisable and 
workable structure.  
 
The choice of the Japanese was not a step in the 
unknown. In the period under review, 1930-1985, 
Thailand underwent a truly fundamental political and 
social transformation, activated and stimulated by 
major external developments and pressures, and by 
internal forces, which had already set in motion 
earlier, sometimes long before, and rested upon 
foundations almost as old as Thai society itself.  In 
fact in 1985 Thailand had become an industrial 
country, in the political sense, according to the 
indicators developed on the basis of Gellner.   
Thailand had become a nation state, still with a king, 
but also with a modernised (rationalised) government 
and bureaucracy. The legitimacy of king and 
government - and their activities - was based on the 
principle of sovereignty of the people and the 
promotion of national economic prosperity. The 
fusion of will, culture and politics – the condition of an 
industrial society, according to Gellner - had become 
a fact, as had the predominance of economic 
rationality. Large segments of the people had 
become involved political actors, especially in the 
cities, where a middle class was quickly evolving. 
Economic entrepreneurs were politically protected 
and even stimulated – most of the entrepreneurs 
were ethnic Chinese, as they were in Malaysia and 
The Philippines, Indonesia, but in Thailand they had 
become recognised as Thai citizens. They had even 
‘appropriated’ a lot of political power – perhaps too 
much. The army, which had ruled the country for 
most of the time since the 1950s– in close co-
operation with segments of the bureaucracy - was 
lessening its grip on politics and policy. In theory, 
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because it wanted this, in practice, because it had 
outlived its use as a political factor: it had lost its 
overview and control 
In fact, one could say, looking back, that the 
transformation into an industrial society took place 
rather smoothly, from the 1930s on, notwithstanding 
some serious drawbacks, caused partly by external 
factors. The only periods which can be considered as 
showing real signs of regression, or worse, were the 
1950s and the second half of the 1970s.  
 
The fact that Thailand had successfully transformed 
in the political sense, does not automatically mean 
that this was true in the economic sense. The main 
remaining question is whether, and to what extent, 
the state apparatus had acquired the capacity to put 
economic growth first, to facilitate and guide that 
growth and to broaden conditions for sustained 
growth, by including ever larger parts of the 
population. Moreover, this had to be done in strongly 
changing external and internal political and economic 
circumstances, which constantly demanded 
additional and more sophisticated administrative 
ability. 
The main conclusion is that the Thai government 
apparatus performed rather well from the 1930s 
onward, with the noteworthy exception of the 1950s 
and parts of the 1970s. The main reasons were a 
long-standing – more than a century - tradition of 
maintaining macro-economic stability, and a lot of 
American economic and financial help, advice, 
training and education. Many of the higher officials 
and military and even businessmen had been trained 
from the 1950s on by the Americans or educated in 
the United States. Whenever the bureaucracy had to 
adapt, they possessed or quickly acquired the 
capacity to do this. They were helped by the fact that 
the international economic environment they had to 
adapt to was strongly dominated by American rules, 
values and regulations, after the Second World War.  
However, this does not imply that the Thai govern-
ment strictly controlled the Thai economy. Rather the 
contrary, one is inclined to say. Whenever it tried to 
do this, the situation went out of control and the 
economy was more hindered than helped. The real 
strength of the Thai government apparatus had to be 
sought elsewhere. The Thai government was at its 
best when it restricted itself to facilitating private 
economic initiative. The real economic ‘heroes’ in 
Thailand were the farmers and the city-based 
entrepreneurs and bankers. They created the new 
prosperity of Thailand.  
The Thai government was not a strong one. In fact, 
one could even say that the Thai government was 
sometimes so weak that it became the instrument of 
one or more pressure groups. In the 1950s, factions 
from the military appropriated the ‘profits’ of newly 
established state firms (often nationalised private 
firms) and seemingly profitable private ones. At the 
end of 1970s, big Bangkok-based private entrepre-
neurs and bankers appropriated, directly or indirectly, 
enough political power to uphold and even 
strengthen restrictions against industrial imports, 
whereas all the economic signs pointed at doing 
exactly the opposite, i.e. opening up to the world 
market.  
Nevertheless, one can conclude that the Thai state 
apparatus most of the time proved to be able to keep 
a balance between autonomy and embeddedness. It 
was increasingly oriented towards the promotion of 
economic growth, became more and more rooted in 
society as a whole, and became slowly less receptive 
to excessively particularistic pressures. 
The economic figures also showed that, at the end of 
the 1980s, Thailand had undergone a transformation 
into an industrial or, in this case, industrialised 
country. How successful this economic transforma-
tion was is shown by the events in 1990s: Thailand 
had become so integrated into the world economy 
and so attractive to foreign investments and foreign 
capital that its economy became more than 
overheated and gave birth to a financial and 
economic crisis which at the end also affected other 
parts of the world, especially in Asia. Quite an 
achievement: not something a so-called underdevel-
oped or agrarian country could do. Although, for 
completeness’ sake, one should add to this remark 
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that Thailand probably only ‘reassembled’ and 
transmitted an already older crisis ‘exported’ by 
Japan to Thailand and other neighbouring countries 
in around 1995.   
 
The transformation-process of Thailand also has 
implications beyond the specific Thai context and 
underlines the usefulness of the theory of Gellner. 
The main implications are: 
• Complex or highly developed agrarian societies 
have an advantage over more ‘simply’ organised 
ones when it comes to the capacity to set in motion 
and sustain a transformation towards an industrial 
society, although they probably will initially often lag 
behind in doing so, because the ruling elites have 
access to a lot of well organised resources for 
blocking further change by using the advances which 
the transformation offers them.  
• Open societies – in the sense of open to and 
oriented towards external trade – are as a rule the 
most adaptive ones. 
• The political, institutional and cultural effects and 
after-effects of colonialism are as important as the 
economic ones, and even have surprisingly far-
reaching effects. 
• For a society to be able to realise a successful 
transformation from an agrarian into an industrial 
society, the potential to do this must already be 
present in that society.  
• Political transformation is a sine –qua non, if not a 
pre-condition for a complete – and economic – 
transformation. 
• Legitimacy is the key to political transformation. 
• The transformation of an agrarian society into an 
industrial one comes down to a fundamental rupture 
with the past: politically, socially, economically and 
culturally. 
• The quintessence of this rupture is the transfor-
mation of a legitimacy based on religious notions and 
personal bonds into a legitimacy based on abstract, 
worldly and utilitarian (rational instrumental) notions. 
• External factors are decisive for setting in motion 
the process of transformation and its continuation. 
• Notwithstanding the influence of external factors, 
internal factors determine whether a transformation 
process will really take off and succeed. 
• The transformation is set in motion by members of 
the local elite, out of political motives. They need to 
have the will, capacity, position and legitimacy to do 
this. 
• The specific way in which the process is set in 
motion has great implications for the shape, direction 
and continuity of the transformation. 
• Every transformation process can stagnate and is 
even likely to do so. 
• In the end, transformation into an industrial 
society means strengthening and emancipating 
economic rationality and behaviour to such an extent 
that economic activities and actors will prevail over 
other activities and actors. In an industrial society, 
politics serve the economy. The main political task is 
to facilitate economic maximisation, rationalisation 
and accumulation.  
• In an industrial society, economic maximisation, 
rationalisation and accumulation have become the 
main fundament and target  of political legitimacy. 
• In an industrial society, economic maximisation, 
rationalisation and accumulation are best served by 
private initiative, based on the notion and protection 
of private property. 
• To understand the transformation process of 
societies, one has to begin with investigating this 
process in depth in the individual societies before 
starting to compare those societies.  
• All transformation processes are historical, in a 
threefold sense. The study of long-term develop-
ments is essential. The process is never teleological. 
Coincidence, singular and unpredictable events 
always have a great impact. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
As far as the overall reflection on the main theory is 
concerned, one could conclude that Gellner’s theory 
has proved remarkably useful for examining and 
interpreting the process of change in Thailand.  
There was nevertheless perhaps an even more 
important finding. A lot of the conclusions suggest 
that the theory would probably be even more useful if 
it was applied to the study of the transformation 
process in societies or countries which have been 
less ‘successful’ - perhaps not so much to further 
their ‘development’, as to deliver arguments on how 
and where their capacities, energy and focus could 
be better put. 
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